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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Zachary Taylor
By Maryann Haggerty
Zachary Taylor joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in January 2009 to lead
the team responsible for managing and unwinding the central bank’s Maiden Lane II 1 and III2
portfolios, which were acquired in connection with the intervention to assist American
International Group (AIG). Taylor later took over responsibility for the Maiden Lane 3 portfolio
consisting of former Bear Stearns assets as well as the unwinding of the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF)4, another crisis-era program. All told, those portfolios
amounted to more than $140 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS),
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default swaps (CDS), commercial and residential
mortgages, and other loans and securities.
This interview was conducted in July of 2020, when Taylor was the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York’s Vice President-Director of Counterparty, Valuation & Credit Risk. He emphasized
that this interview represents his own opinions, not those of the Federal Reserve Bank or the
Federal Reserve System.
Complex tasks require expertise: Unwinding the portfolios called for people with a
wide range of expertise, both internal FRBNY staff and external contractors.
Taylor was the first outside hire to join the FRBNY team tasked with overseeing and
unwinding the AIG-related Maiden Lane portfolios. He came to the job with more than a
decade of private-sector experience in structured finance, including CDOs. He knew, “how
Maiden Lane II was a special purpose vehicle created by the FRBNY to purchase from an AIG subsidiary a
certain investment portfolio relating to its securities lending program, in which AIG lent securities in exchange
for cash. AIG invested a significant portion of these cash proceeds into residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS). Beginning in 2007, market stresses relating to subprime mortgages caused the RMBS to lose value and
become illiquid creating liquidity strains for AIG with respect to repaying counterparties who sought to return
the borrowed securities and regain their cash.
1

Maiden Lane III was a special purpose vehicle created by the FRBNY to purchase from AIG counterparties
certain collateralized debt obligations (CDOS) in order to cancel the credit default swaps that AIG had written
on them. CDS are like a type of insurance that protects the buyer from a drop in value of the CDO. If the value
of the underlying CDO drops, even if there has been no actual loss, the owner may be entitled to additional
collateral under the CDS. In 2008, collateral calls with respect to the CDSs were creating great liquidity stresses
on AIG).
2

Maiden Lane was a special purpose vehicle created by the FRBNY to purchase from Bear Stearns a certain
portfolio of assets in connection with its acquisition by JPMorgan in March 2008.
3

The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was established by the Federal Reserve to support
the flow of credit to consumers and businesses. The TALF enabled the issuance of asset-backed securities
backed by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration
(SBA), and certain other assets at a time when these markets were extremely strained and near frozen.
4
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the sausage is made and where all the bonds were placed,” he recalls. That background
complemented traditional Federal Reserve staffer strengths.
I think we internally quickly realized that the complexity of managing these portfolios
was such that the initial premise that we could rely on our vendors and external
expertise to sort of see us through what we hoped would be a faster unwind of these
vehicles was just not really tenable, that we had to build out that internal expertise. .
. . After I joined, we continued to expand the team of expertise, which required hiring
in many of the different asset classes that we owned. So, for example, we needed to
hire workout specialists who had experience in commercial real estate, we needed to
hire residential mortgage expertise, and we ultimately built out a team—it was
somewhere in the neighborhood of about 30 people internally—to work on the
unwind of these three facilities.
But the outside contractors, particularly BlackRock, the big asset management firm, played
an important partnership role, he says.
I think having that external vendor in place, no matter how much expertise we build
up, even if we had all of the same level of expertise that BlackRock had in this case, it
was still extremely valuable to have this external face to the financial markets, where
we were not negotiating with other broker-dealers and investors around
restructuring and selling assets, and we could be the face behind the curtain. That
made it much easier for us to operate in the financial markets as a central bank.
Lessons learned then about vendors have carried through to the 2020 crisis; they allow the
central bank to respond quickly and effectively, but hiring vendors does pose issues. Taylor
says, “So we have also made it clear that to the extent that we needed to react very quickly
in this crisis to hire external vendors, in that those vendors did not go through a competitive
bidding process, that we would revisit each of those contracts and ensure that we did open
them up over time.”
Processes that work in theory don’t always work in practice: Listening to markets is
key.
Taylor’s team determined that it would auction off the securities in the Maiden Lane II
portfolio—residential mortgage-backed securities—to investors over time. Relying on
accepted auction theory, they designed an open process where almost 65 broker-dealers
participated in weekly auctions. For about six weeks in the spring of 2011, Taylor recalls, the
auctions ran as expected, with healthy demand and good prices.
Then a strange thing happened, and this sort of went against that auction theory.
What we realized was, by opening up the auctions to any broker-dealer that wanted
to participate, we actually were creating a chilling effect for the investor community.
The broker-dealers were representing end investors, and if the end investor wanted
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to buy one of the assets in our auction, they would submit an offer through one of
these broker-dealers. But because there were 60 broker-dealers participating in the
auction, the investors didn’t really know who to submit their bids through, and
oftentimes they would submit them through a lot of broker-dealers, and they were
being bombarded with inquiries from salespeople from every single desk on the
street.
The result was investor fatigue, which led to lower prices being obtained at auction. “This
happened pretty quickly, and it really happened across the board. We saw this sort of cliff
effect, where there was a big drop-off in the prices we were seeing in the auctions, and we
realized that we went from getting a strong investor bid to getting a weak broker-dealer bid,”
he says. The FRBNY halted the auctions that spring. It restarted them in December, but this
time with just a handful of broker-dealers permitted to bid for large blocks of securities.
The lesson … that we took from that is that sometimes it’s easier to do things in a less
complicated manner. Auction theory might tell you one thing, but the markets might
tell you another. You need to listen to the markets. You need to closely evaluate what
investors are telling you—what you’re seeing through pricing—and you need to be
able to shift strategy and reevaluate your approach.
Transparency is not dangerous.
The Federal Reserve System, long known for being opaque, gradually became more
transparent about its actions through the financial crisis and its aftermath. That embrace of
transparency continues, as Taylor points out.
One of the big lessons that we learned, which … I think you can see through our
actions here with the current intervention: transparency for a central bank is critical.
We learned lessons and became more transparent over time with these [Maiden Lane,
ML II, ML III and TALF] and our other facilities that we set up in the 2008 financial
crisis. I think there were times in which we were too focused on a fear that
transparency might impact our maximization of returns for the taxpayer. As we
started to test the waters with becoming more and more transparent, I think we
quickly realized that increased transparency had little negative impact on our
ultimate return.
____________________________________________
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